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The Development of Diaspora Engagement Policies  
in Burundi and Rwanda 
 
 
Sonja Fransen1 & Melissa Siegel2 
 
Abstract 
 
Many countries are currently exploring their diaspora’s potential to contribute to local 
development processes. These countries face numerous challenges in effectively engaging 
their diasporas such as a lack of experience and resources. Conflict-affected countries, 
however, face legacies from the past that might challenge diaspora engagement processes. 
They often also struggle with security issues in the post-conflict phase in addition to these 
challenges. This chapter compares the diaspora engagement initiatives of two neighbouring 
countries in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa: Rwanda and Burundi. Both countries 
recognize the potential of their diasporas, but they are at different stages of diaspora policy 
development. Results show that Rwanda actively addresses the challenges in reaching out to 
their diaspora by focusing on diasporic unity and communication between diaspora groups 
and the Rwanda government. Rwanda has also embedded its Diaspora Policy in its long-term 
development plan. A lack of data however exists on the effectiveness of these efforts. In 
contrast, Burundi still needs to create the diasporic institutional environment for its diaspora 
engagement and diaspora engagement policies. A high level of cooperation should be present 
between ministries, international organizations and the diaspora to create effective policies. 
For diaspora engagement initiatives to succeed in conflict-affected societies such as Burundi 
and Rwanda, however, the most important condition is that the countries’ security situations 
become increasingly stable in the near future.  
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1. Introduction 
To ‘convert the brain drain into brain gain’ (Oucho 2006), many countries are 
exploring diaspora engagement opportunities that can contribute to local development. The 
commitment of home country governments to harnessing the development potential of the 
diaspora is revealed by the launch of different government institutions in developing 
countries. These diaspora-specific institutions have been created to establish an institutional 
infrastructure to strengthen and increase the links between diasporas and their home countries 
(Agunias 2009; ICMPD and IOM 2010).3 This trend of diaspora involvement in local 
development originates from a general interest in globalization issues that emerged in 
research and policy making in the past decades (Castles and Miller 2009). Simultaneous to 
this trend, research on remittances–the money migrants send home to family and friends in 
their origin country—increased sharply due to a substantial rise in official remittance flows 
around the world (De Haas 2006).   
There are many channels through which diasporas can exert influence on their home 
countries. The most obvious channel is monetary support by means of either collective or 
individual remittances. Most early diaspora policy initiatives focused on the facilitation and 
enhancement of remittances flows (De Haas 2006; Newland and Patrick 2004). However, 
there is growing awareness of other channels of diaspora involvement, such as the transfers 
of skills and knowledge, the role diasporas can play in advocating for their cultures and 
promoting their home countries as tourist destinations, and the diaspora’s participation in 
political processes (De Haas 2006). In addition, the influence of diasporas on economic 
processes through investments, market innovation, and the outsourcing of production is 
currently a major driving force of diaspora involvement for many developing countries. 
                                                 
3 This emergency of new policy making has led the International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) to work on a joint project to assess the diaspora engagement policy at an institutional level in several 
African countries. Their project, MTM: A Dialogue in Action: Linking Emigrant Communities for more Development recently published 
(2010) An Inventory of Institutional Capabilities and Practices in Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Syria and Tunisia outlining the current institutional frameworks and policies in place in each country to engage 
their diaspora.  
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Countries interested in their diaspora’s potential take different approaches in addressing the 
resources of their diasporas, depending on their needs and capacities (Agunias 2009; 
Newland and Patrick 2004). Conflict-affected countries, for example, are often interested in 
tapping their diaspora’s potential to attain economic reconstruction and sustainable peace.  
Conflict-affected countries face important challenges in constructing effective and 
sustainable diaspora engagement policies, however. First, diasporas are rarely homogenous 
groups (see e.g. Warnecke 2010). So called ‘conflict-generated diasporas’ (Lyons 2004) often 
include a complex mix of people that arrived in their host countries at different times, for 
different reasons, through different means, and with different statuses (Koser and Van Hear 
2003). These large differences within the diaspora imply different attitudes toward the 
country of origin. Similarly, the ways in which they are involved at the individual or 
collective level in economic, social or political networks is highly variable. Due to this 
heterogeneity, governments struggle when reaching out to their diasporas or may even be 
selective in their efforts.  
Second, the fact that diasporas often consist of different groups of migrants may lead 
to low levels of trust within the diaspora. A case study on Burundian organizations in the 
Netherlands, for example, showed that most Burundians were organized along ethnic lines, 
and a high level of suspicion existed between the groups (Fransen and Onga’yo 2010). This 
could lead to tensions and sometimes even conflict within the diaspora. Diasporic 
heterogeneity implies different groups may not form cohesive bodies that act collectively in 
their home-country engagement.  
Third, there is often distrust between the government and its diaspora. Migrants 
fleeing from conflict often leave their countries involuntarily—many times in an attempt to 
escape political prosecution. These conflict-generated diasporas sometimes harbour 
grievances towards their homelands, which may result in negative involvement (Braziel 
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2008; Cochrane 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2008; Lyons 2004). Certain African 
diasporas have been reported to be actively involved in conflict dynamics in their home 
countries, either by supporting and facilitating conflict or inhibiting it (Mohamoud 2006; 
Turner and Mossin 2010; Warnecke 2010). This history of migration motives and previous 
involvement in home-land politics influences the future cooperation between governments 
and their diaspora members (see e.g. Turner and Mossin 2010).  
Fourth, conflict-affected countries often experience incidents of conflict or violence in 
the aftermath of war. A ‘post-conflict’ country is rarely completely free of conflict--a fact 
that highlights the ambiguity of the term (Addison and Brück 2009). These incidents of 
violence not only divert the attention of home country governments away from diaspora 
engagement, but also prevent the diaspora from being actively involved through investments 
and local participatory programs.  
This chapter deals with the development of diaspora engagement policies in Burundi 
and Rwanda. These countries are located in the Central African Great Lakes Region, a region 
characterized by failing democratic transitions, civil wars, and extreme poverty, all of which 
have contributed to numerous violent conflicts and large migration movements over the past 
decades. Whereas Rwanda marked the 15th anniversary of the 1994 genocide in 2009 amidst 
a stable political environment characterized by large-scale reconstruction and reconciliation 
programs, Burundi has only recently become politically stable after the 2005 elections and 
the 2006 peace agreement with the Force National de Liberation (FNL), the last active rebel 
group in the country. Both Burundi and Rwanda recognize the potential of their diasporas in 
rebuilding their countries, but their diaspora engagement policies are at different stages of 
development. Rwanda put into place a diaspora engagement policy in 2009 and considered it 
as a tool in reaching the goals of their Vision 2020, Rwanda’s national development plan. 
Burundi is currently taking its first steps in creating a diaspora engagement policy. In the 
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Rwandan case, the question is to what extent the diaspora policy has been effective in 
reaching its diaspora and tapping into its potential? This might provide interesting insights for 
the policy development process in Burundi, where the extent to which the Burundian 
government can realize its diaspora potential is questioned because of the fragile state of 
peace within the country and the challenges the country still faces in terms of national 
reconciliation (Fransen and Onga’yo 2010).  
 6
Figure 1: The Central African Great Lakes Region 
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2. Histories of Migration and Diaspora Formation in Rwanda and Burundi 
Rwanda and Burundi, as neighbouring countries in the Central African Great Lakes Region, 
share some similarities in terms of their history of conflict and migration. These histories are 
at some times intertwined, for conflict and large displacements in the Great Lakes Region 
have evolved into cyclical patterns with frequent spill-over effects (Fransen and Onga’yo 
2010; Spaan and Van Moppes 2006). Important differences between the two countries exist 
as well, however. As the development of diaspora engagement policies is highly embedded in 
the historic context of the two countries, this chapter provides a short overview of the conflict 
and migration histories of both countries.  
 
2.1 Rwanda 
Rwanda was characterized by violent ethnic conflict for many years.4 The Tutsi minority 
dominated Rwandan politics at the beginning of the 19th century, and under Belgian colonial 
rule the ethnic distinction between Hutu and Tutsi intensified. This led to a Hutu rebellion in 
1959 and the deaths of almost 50,000 Tutsi. After independence the Hutu majority took 
power and violently suppressed the Tutsi; many Tutsi died in mass killings in the early 1960s 
and 1970s. In the early 1990s, tensions increased once more and escalated into a civil war 
that lasted for four years. Then, on April 6, 1994, the president of Rwanda Juvénal 
Hayarimana was killed in an airplane crash, and genocide broke out in Rwanda. More than 
500,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed over a period of 100 days (Des Forges 1999). 
As a result of these violent conflicts, Rwanda has seen large migratory flows. In 1994 the 
conflict in Rwanda caused a massive migration wave that included over two million people 
(out of a total population of 6.5 million). Most migrants fled to both neighbouring countries 
(Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi) and Europe.  
                                                 
4 see e.g. Prunier, 1995, for an overview of Rwanda’s history of conflict 
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The stock of emigrants originating from Rwanda as a percentage of the population 
was 2.2 percent in 2005 (World Bank 2008). Most of these migrants settled in Uganda, 
Tanzania, Belgium, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy, 
or the Netherlands. The emigration rate for Rwanda was 2.7 percent in 2009. A total of 85.2 
percent of these migrants moved to other African countries (UNDP 2009).  
 Rwanda’s diaspora population is scattered around the globe, and is large and diverse. 
It is also active and highly politically engaged (Black, McLean Hilker, and Pooley 2004). 
Rwanda’s skilled emigration rate in 2000 was 19 percent of all tertiary-educated individuals 
(World Bank 2008), which shows that a large share of Rwanda’s diaspora is highly educated. 
Rwandans also contribute substantially to their home-country economy by means of 
remittances. Officially-recorded remittances flows have increased steadily over the past 
decade, from US $7 million in 2000 to US $21 million in 2006 (World Bank 2008). The 
UNDP (2009) reports that in 2007, US $51 million in remittances were received by Rwanda. 
According to the Diaspora General Directorate in Rwanda, however, the total amount of 
remittances received increased from US $42.85 million in 2005 to US $172.40 million in 
2009.  
 
2.2 Burundi 
Burundi has been plagued by more waves of civil conflict since its independence from 
Belgium in 1962 than Rwanda has. Burundi’s first democratically-elected government was 
installed in 2005, and only recently has the country experienced a period of stability and 
peace. As a result of the violent conflicts in Burundi and surrounding countries, the country 
has experienced large migration flows (see Table 1 for an overview), with the largest out-
migration flows taking place in 1972 and 1993. These flows mainly consisted of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) seeking safe havens in other parts of Burundi and refugees fleeing 
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over the border to neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. At the same time, Burundi served as a destination for refugees from 
other countries as conflict continued across the whole region (Fransen and Siegel 2010).  
 
Table 1: Major Conflicts and Out-Migration in Burundi 
 1965 1972 1988 1991 1993 
      
Duration of conflict (months) 2 4 2 1 108 
Deaths (thousands) 5 200 15 1-3 300 
Refugees (thousands)1 0 300 50 38 687 
Ratio of deaths plus refugees 
over total population 
0.2 14.0 1.3 0.7 17.1 
      
Source: Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005.  
 
Burundi is still both an immigration and emigration country. Refugees residing in 
Burundi are mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to some extent, 
Rwanda. The country currently hosts around 100,000 IDPs as well. Since the security 
situation has improved in Burundi, the number of IDPs has decreased slowly from over 
280,000 in 2003 (ICG 2003) to 100,000 (UNHCR 2010) as of October 2010. Most refugees 
originating from Burundi live in Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, 
and Rwanda. Tanzania currently hosts the most Burundian refugees, most of whom are 
located in the ‘Old Settlements’ created by the Tanzanian government after the 1972 inflow 
of refugees from Burundi.5 
A smaller proportion of Burundian refugees fled to western countries such as 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, and Canada, where they established an active 
Burundian diaspora network (Fransen and Ong’ayo 2010; Turner 2008a; 2008b). An 
estimation of the size of the Burundian diaspora is difficult to provide as this depends heavily 
on the immigration statistics of the different migrant-receiving countries (Fransen and Siegel 
                                                 
5 In 1972 a genocide took place in Burundi that was directed at Hutu society members and that was executed by a rebellion group from 
within the mostly Tutsi dominated army. An estimated 80,000 to 210,000 Hutu were killed during this period and hundreds of thousand 
people fled the country, mostly to neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and Rwanda (Fransen & Onga’yo, 2010). 
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2010). The Burundian diaspora, which mostly consists of Burundians from Hutu origin, has 
been highly politically active:  “Their main raison d’être was to create alternative visions of 
society and to attempt by all means to influence and change the political system in Burundi 
[…]” (Turner and Mossin 2010, p. 5). The political views within the diaspora differed 
substantially, however, due to the different migration histories of the diaspora members.  
The Burundian diaspora, like the Rwandan diaspora, is well equipped in terms of 
human capital. Many diaspora members are highly educated, yet Burundi itself currently 
lacks residents of these skills as a result of decades of civil war and discrimination in the 
educational system (Turner and Mossin 2010). New migration patterns from Burundi have 
recently emerged, mostly consisting of highly-skilled migrants who move to Europe and 
Western Africa. South Africa also receives a substantial number of migrants from Burundi. 
These migrants can be mainly classified as economic migrants who are in search of better 
educational and economic opportunities. Due to a lack of data, no official statistics on these 
flows are available. Ratha and Xu (2008) estimate stock of emigrants at 315,477 or 4.2 
percent of the population in 2005, with top destinations including Tanzania, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Canada, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Italy, and 
Germany. They also estimate the emigration rate of the tertiary educated at almost 20 
percent, which includes a large percentage of doctors and nurses.  
Officially-recorded remittances, a clear way that diaspora can be engaged in their 
home country, were estimated at US $1 million dollars in 2006, down from US $4 million in 
2003. Remittances constitute an important source of income in Burundi even though access 
to international remittances might not apply equally to all groups and regions. Remittances 
are mainly used to meet basic subsistence needs of family members, relatives and close 
friends as well as for education and health care. Remittances are also used for the 
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construction of houses and purchase of property in preparation for return or as an investment 
(De Bruyn and Wets 2006; Fransen and Onga’yo 2010).  
 
3. Diaspora Engagement Initiatives in Rwanda and Burundi 
 
3.1 Rwanda 
In the early 2000’s, around ten years after the 1994 Genocide, Rwanda started to recognize its 
diaspora potential (Black, McLean Hilker, and Pooley 2004). Before that time, developing 
international migration and diaspora engagement policies was not a high priority for the 
Rwandan government, which was struggling to not only rebuild its economic infrastructure 
but also to restore social ties within society. In June 2009 the Ministry of External Relations 
and Internal Cooperation of Rwanda published the Rwanda Diaspora Policy (Republic of 
Rwanda 2009b). In this policy the government introduced its strategy to engage its diaspora 
in national development and to strengthen the ties between Rwanda and its citizens abroad. 
As the Rwanda Diaspora Policy states: “the Government of Rwanda (GoR) strongly believes 
that the Rwandan Diaspora is an important constituent that cannot be ignored and which, if it 
is well harnessed, can contribute to national socio-economic development” (Republic of 
Rwanda 2009b, p. 5).  
 The Rwandan Diaspora Policy is based on three pillars: the increase of cohesion within 
and between the different Rwandan diaspora around the world, the stimulation of 
communication between Rwanda and its diaspora, and the stimulation of the active role of the 
Rwandan diaspora in the socio-economic development of the country. The diaspora is to be 
engaged in development processes by means of financial transfers, knowledge and skill 
transfers, contributions to technology development, export promotion, and the promotion of 
Rwandan culture. Sectors in which the diaspora could contribute are education, health, 
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business, investment, unity and reconciliation, community development, and foreign 
investments (Republic of Rwanda 2009).   
The Rwanda Diaspora Policy is considered a tool for reaching the goals of the Vision 
2020 program, which is Rwanda’s development plan that was implemented in 2000. The 
main goal of the Vision 2020 initiative is to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country 
by the year 2020. At the time that the initiative was first implemented, this goal entailed, for 
example, a per capita income increase of more than 300 percent and a decrease of poverty by 
200 percent (Republic of Rwanda 2000). Table 2 provides an overview of the pillars of the 
Vision 2020. The Rwanda Diaspora Policy is mainly based on three pillars of the Vision 
2020: good governance, private sector development, and human resource development.  
Unity and reconciliation are important underlying themes in the Vision 2020, which 
include the diaspora as well: “Rwanda will become a modern, united and prosperous nation 
founded on the positive values of its culture. The nation will be open to the world, including 
its own Diaspora. Rwandans will be a people, sharing the same vision for the future and 
ready to contribute to social cohesion, equity and equality of opportunity” (Republic of 
Rwanda 2000, p. 12). The Rwandan diaspora is also explicitly mentioned in the Rwanda 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (IMF 2008). The diaspora is, for example, 
mentioned in the context of diaspora bonds, following the example of other developing 
countries in Africa such as Ethiopia. Emphasis is also placed on the transfer of skills of 
Rwandan migrants through different programs and projects, and on their potential 
contributions to national savings by means of investments.      
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Table 2: Rwanda’s Pillars of the Vision 2020 
Pillars of the Vision 2020 Cross-cutting areas of Vision 2020 
  
1. Good governance and a capable state 
1. Gender equality 2. Human resource development and a    
    knowledge based economy 
3. Private sector-led economy 2. Protection of environment and sustainable  
    natural resource management 4. Infrastructure development 
5. Productive and market oriented  
    agriculture 3. Science and technology, including ICT 6. Regional and international economic  
    integration 
  
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2000). 
 
 
3.2 Burundi 
The development of migration and development policy in Burundi began only recently due to 
recent stability in the country. The long period of conflict in Burundi shifted the priorities of 
the Burundian government to other pressing issues such as security and the provision of basic 
needs. The government is now becoming more interested in migration and development 
policies and is establishing different initiatives to tap into the resources of the diaspora. 
Different international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are active in the 
field of migration and development in Burundi as well (Fransen and Siegel 2010).  
 According to Turner and Mossin (2010), the Burundian government has three 
motivations to establish good relations with its diaspora members abroad. First, the 
Burundian diaspora has been an important political actor from a distance since its 
establishment. Being on good terms with previous political actors who are now resident 
abroad is envisioned as a good strategy to relieve some of the political tensions that still 
simmer in Burundi. Second, the Burundian government is highly interested in the skills and 
knowledge of its citizens abroad for use in rebuilding the country. Third, in order to establish 
national unity and reconciliation—both of which are essential to securing sustainable peace 
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in the country--strong bonds with the Burundian diaspora would be key, as they can help 
alleviate former ethnic tensions.  
  The Burundian diaspora has been engaged in activities in Burundi throughout the 
duration of its exile, but after 2005 when the conflict officially ended, their role changed from 
being political actors to potential players in nation-building and reconstruction efforts (Turner 
2008a). The Burundian diaspora has much to offer in terms of monetary support and in the 
transfer of knowledge and skills (Turner and Mossin 2010). Many members of the diaspora 
are highly skilled and specialised in health and education (Ratha and Xu 2008). From within 
the Burundian diaspora, efforts are being made to reunite diaspora members to contribute to 
the communities and provinces they left behind as well. In Belgium, for example, the 
Burundian diaspora, which is mainly comprised of refugees stemming from the 1972 and 
1993 refugee waves, is becoming better-structured and organised to address collective 
reconstruction efforts (IOM 2009).    
 
4. Institutions Involved in Diaspora Engagement 
 
4.1 Rwanda 
Since 2000, different initiatives have been put into place in Rwanda to realize the potential of 
the Rwandan diaspora, which is playfully referred to as Rwanda’s ‘sixth province’ (Republic 
of Rwanda 2010). The Rwandan diaspora is defined as “all Rwandans who left their country 
voluntarily or were forced to live in other countries of the world and are willing to contribute 
to the development of Rwanda” (Republic of Rwanda 2009, p. 6). To engage its diaspora 
Rwanda has established specific government bodies, but it also cooperates closely with 
different international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to better 
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link its diaspora. See Appendix 1 for a graphic overview of the institutional involvement in 
diaspora engagement in Rwanda and Burundi. 
 
4.1.1 Government initiatives 
In 2001 the Rwanda government launched the Rwanda Global Diaspora Network (RGDN). 
The RDGN is however an independent association that is led by Rwandan diaspora members 
in Rwanda’s capital Kigali. The RDGN is considered an umbrella organization under which 
member organisations from varying host countries are brought together for the sake of 
stimulating and promoting the cooperation and communication among the Rwandan diaspora 
worldwide. The goal of this network is to stimulate financial transfers--including remittances, 
investments and savings--from the diaspora to Rwanda.  
In the same year the Rwandan Government also established a department on diaspora 
engagement within the Ministry of External Relations and Internal Cooperation 
(MINAFFET). The Diaspora General Directorate (DGD) was eventually established in June 
2008. This directorate is part of the General Directorates within the Ministry of External 
Relations and Internal Cooperation, and was installed to enforce the linkages between 
Rwanda and its citizens abroad. The DGD provides information on investment possibilities, 
information on job opportunities, and practical assistance to Rwandans who would like to be 
involved in their home country. The DGD currently has five departments: administration, 
investment promotion, mobilisation and advocacy, capacity building, and information and 
communication.  
The national banking system in Rwanda is heavily involved in diaspora engagement 
initiatives as well. In 2008 the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) in cooperation with the 
Rwandan diaspora set up the Rwandan Diaspora Mutual Fund (RDMF). The fund was put 
under supervision of the DGD and was designed to collect the financial resources from 
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Rwandans living abroad to invest in national development. At the beginning the RDMF was 
invested in treasury bonds that are issued by the BNR. At a later stage the RDMF will be 
used to invest in corporate bonds and stocks. The government treasury bonds were first 
issued by the BNR in 2008 to stimulate contributions from the diaspora to support Rwanda’s 
capital market.  
 
 
4.1.2 International organizations 
The DGD in Rwanda works closely with several international organizations, such as the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Different programs have been set up 
to engage the Rwandan diaspora, such as the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) 
Great Lakes initiative implemented by the IOM in 2001, the volunteer services provided by 
VSO, and the Support Project to the Implementation of The Rwanda Transfer of Knowledge 
Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Volunteer Programme established by UNDP. Both 
the TOKTEN and MIDA programme were transferred from the Ministry of Public Service 
and Labour (MIFOTRA) to the DGD in 2009 to enhance coordination. The IOM reports that 
around 100 projects have been completed since the beginning of the MIDA programme.  
 The IOM has also been working in Rwanda on the World Diaspora Database since 
2009. This initiative is part of the MIDA programme and is designed to track the diaspora of 
several participating countries according to their current countries of residence, country of 
origin, and educational and professional characteristics. The aim of establishing the database 
is to analyze the human resources that diaspora have at their disposal to contribute to their 
home countries.  
 
4.1.3 Non-governmental organizations 
 17
Apart from government bodies and international organizations, Rwanda also hosts many 
independent diaspora associations such as the Rwanda Convention Association (RCA), the 
Rwanda-American Chamber of Commerce (RACC), and Rwanda Diaspora Investment Ltd. 
Many different projects are implemented by the numerous diaspora NGOs, and frequent 
gatherings take place in which the different diaspora organizations meet and discuss their 
involvement in Rwanda. An example of such a gathering is the Rwanda Convention, which is 
organized each year by the Rwanda Convention Association.  
 
4.2 Burundi 
The issue of diaspora involvement in reconstruction efforts has recently risen on the agenda 
of Burundian policy makers. While the diaspora were previously engaged in the domestic 
political process from abroad, with the onset of a more stable peaceful situation the diaspora 
has begun to focus its efforts on development and reconstruction efforts. Burundi is now 
following Rwanda’s lead by creating a formal infrastructure to manage and facilitate diaspora 
involvement as a means to boost its economy.  
Both state and non-state actors are currently active in the area of diaspora engagement 
in Burundi. The main state actors in diaspora engagement are the Ministry of External 
Relations and Internal Cooperation and the Ministry of Labour and Civil Service, although it 
has been stated that only the Ministry of Public Security is now in charge of migration 
management and policy. International organization involvement in diaspora engagement 
comes mainly from the IOM, and non-governmental involvement stems mainly from private 
initiatives in Europe (particularly Belgium). See Appendix 1 for a quick overview. 
 
4.2.1 Government initiatives 
 18
The Ministry of External Relations and Internal Cooperation has created the Directorate of 
Diaspora to address diaspora engagement while the Ministry of Labour and Civil Service 
runs the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme established by the IOM 
locally. Recently, however, the Ministry of Public Security in Burundi has been given 
exclusive responsibility to address migration management issues and to construct the 
migration and diaspora involvement policy. 
The Ministry of External Relations and Internal Cooperation created the Directorate 
of Diaspora in October 2009, which became staffed in January 2010. The Directorate is very 
young and seems to be a step in the right direction with regards to migration and 
development policy making, but it lacks the capacity to be effective with a staff of only three 
people. These three people are tasked with understanding the greater diaspora and forging 
connections with them. One of the Directorate’s first tasks is to create a database of the 
diaspora through different embassies abroad, but this task is proving to be very difficult 
because of distrust within the diaspora. Now that the Ministry of Public Security is in charge 
of migration management and policy, it is unclear how the other ministries will fit into the 
new scheme.  
 
4.2.2 International Organizations 
The Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) program is an Africa-wide program run by 
the IOM in conjunction with home country governments, and its primary objective is to 
engage highly-skilled members of the diaspora in periods of short-term return for capacity 
building. The MIDA program in Burundi has existed since 2001, is run through the Ministry 
of Labour and Civil Service, and is part of the “MIDA Great Lakes” program, which includes 
Rwanda. The program is currently in its fourth phase and is run in conjunction with the IOM 
in Kinshasa and IOM Brussels, where it is also financed. In the case of Burundi, MIDA is 
 19
focused on the diaspora in Europe and particularly in Belgium. The first three phases of the 
program, from 2002-2008, dealt exclusively with education projects. There are currently 
eight projects running in the areas of education, health, and rural development. A total of 131 
people have moved through the program since its inception in 2001, and 22 will have 
completed the program in 2010 alone.  
 
4.2.3 Non-governmental Organizations  
In Belgium, the Burundian diaspora, which is mainly comprised of refugees stemming from 
the 1972 and 1993 refugee waves, is becoming better-structured and organised to address 
collective reconstruction efforts (IOM 2009). After seeing a need for reduced costs of 
sending remittances and to reduce the risks in informal methods, for instance, an association 
of Burundians in Belgium took the initiative to create Mutualité d’Epargne et de Crédit 
(Mutec) (Turner and Mossin 2010). Turner and Mossin (2010) also note other initiatives 
taken on by the Burundian diaspora, including town twinning projects and home town 
associations. Other development initiatives include Competences Sans Frontiers (CSF), 
which tries to involve the Burundian Diaspora in development. One of the largest diaspora 
organizations is the Communauté Burundaise de Belgique (CBB). According to the same 
study, other initiatives taken by Burundians in the diaspora include CIRID (Centre 
Indépendant de Recherches et d'Initiatives pour le Dialogue or Independent Centre of 
Research and Initiative for the Dialogue) based in Geneva. Although their primary task is to 
promote peaceful dialogue, the organization has also been involved in various development 
projects. While the largest share of Burundians are organized in Belgium, there are about 20 
Burundian diaspora organizations in the Netherlands, including both formally registered 
organizations and informal groups (Fransen and Onga’yo 2010).6 The active diaspora in 
                                                 
6 Interview with BWPD November 26, 2009 
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Belgium is even more notable for their organisation of large-scale meetings such as the 
European Meeting of the Burundian Diaspora, which they held in May 2008 with the theme 
“Engaging the Diaspora of the reconstruction of Burundi” (IOM 2009)  
 
4.2.4 Private organizations 
While the diaspora has been active in the political arena, more has been done recently to 
attract their financial investments. According to Turner and Mossin (2010), a private bank 
called BCB (Banque de Crédit de Bujumbura, www.bcb.bi) has started two initiatives to help 
the diaspora in their financial activities in Burundi. First, the bank made it possible for the 
diaspora to open savings accounts in the bank and to manage their accounts via online 
banking. The objective of these accounts is to ‘aid members of the diaspora who have the 
means, in creating liaisons with their country of origin, so that they may have sufficient funds 
when on vacation in Burundi or to invest – in particular in property’ (Turner and Mossin 
2010). The second initiative aims to help the diaspora invest in real estate in Burundi. If a 
diaspora member has a savings account with the bank, they are able to take a loan and invest 
in a house in a specific area that is to be created along Lake Tanganyika, south of Bujumbura.  
As mentioned earlier, an association of Burundians in Belgium took the initiative to 
create Mutualité d’Epargne et de Crédit (MUTEC) to provide money transfer services.7 
MUTEC first opened an office in Bujumbura in July 2004 and now has offices across the 
country while also expanding to five other countries in Africa. MUTEC is a private initiative 
similar in structure and function to a micro credit organization (Turner and Mossin 2010). 
Another type of private initiative is Radio Isanganiro, or “Meeting Point ", which was 
established in 2002. This Bujumbura-based station has the objective to promote peace and 
reconciliation through dialogue (www.isanganiro.org). Since 2003 Radio Isanganiro has 
                                                 
7 Mutec’s homepage (www.codibu.org). 
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broadcast an interactive programme ‘Diaspora’, where the Diaspora can call in and discuss 
recent events in the country (Turner and Mossin 2010).  
 
 
5. Diaspora Engagement: Challenges and Opportunities in Burundi and Rwanda 
 
5.1 Divisions within the diaspora 
As described in the introduction, the first challenge countries recovering from violent conflict 
face in their diaspora engagement initiatives is the heterogeneity of, or divisions within, the 
diaspora. Second, this heterogeneity might lead to an internally divided diaspora with low 
levels of cohesion and trust. Both the Rwandan and Burundian diaspora are highly 
heterogeneous. Refugees arrived at their destinations in different time periods, for different 
reasons, and through migration flows that often represented violence or oppression of a 
certain ethnic group.  
The Rwandan government acknowledges the diversity of its diaspora by classifying 
them into different types of migrants: 1) Rwandans that fled the country due to political and 
security reasons, 2) Rwandans that went abroad for economic reasons or educational 
purposes, and 3) the descendents of these types of migrants (Republic of Rwanda 2009). 
Increasing the cohesion within and between the different Rwandan diaspora is one of the 
pillars of the Rwandan diaspora policy. Different initiatives have been launched to bring 
different diaspora groups together and stimulate cooperation. Not all diaspora groups are 
supporters of the current government, though, and there are indications that the Rwandan 
government is selective in reaching out to its diaspora (see e.g. Black, McLean Hilker, and 
Pooley 2004). This claim has, however, not been researched in detail.  
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 The Burundian diaspora is heterogenous as well, and internal divisions within the 
diaspora, mostly in terms of political views and ethnicity, have challenged the unity of the 
diaspora (Fransen and Onga’yo 2010; Turner and Mossin 2010). Turner and Mossin (2010) 
even argue that, because of this heterogeneity, it is not correct to use the term ‘the Burundian 
diaspora’. Historical and still-present differences within the diaspora, and between different 
organizations within the diaspora, have led to cases of low trust levels between diaspora 
groups, for example in the Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands (Fransen and Onga’yo 
2010). These divisions naturally challenge the diaspora engagement initiatives by the 
Burundian government and should be taken into account in the design of a diaspora 
engagement policy.  
 
5.2 Relationships with the host country 
For diaspora engagement initiatives to succeed, relationships between home country 
governments and their diaspora abroad must be constructive and structured along frequent 
communication (Agunias 2009). In conflict-affected societies, however, the history of 
migration, motives, and previous involvement in home-land politics of diaspora members 
may influence future cooperation between governments and their diaspora.  
 The Rwandan government focuses specifically on the stimulation of communication 
between Rwanda and its diaspora through its diaspora policy. The Rwanda Global Diaspora 
Network, for example, was launched to stimulate communication and hereby enforce the 
linkages between the different diaspora groups and the Rwandan government. In addition the 
Rwandan government has made an effort to map its diaspora around the globe by 
participating in the World Diaspora Database, which was designed and initiated by the IOM.  
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The heterogeneity8 within the Burundian diaspora clearly has an effect on the 
relationship between the Burundian government and its diaspora. As described earlier, the 
Burundian diaspora is currently in a process of transformation following the elections in 
2005. The Burundian government is trying to enforce the linkages with its citizens abroad, 
but diaspora members themselves currently hold different views on their engagement in 
peace and reconstruction efforts in Burundi (Turner and Mossin 2010). Some diaspora 
members are positive about the initiatives of the Burundian government to reach out to its 
diaspora while others do not trust the intentions of the government and continue to take on an 
opposing role. Turner and Mossin (2010) also argue that the diaspora engagement initiatives 
that are employed by the Burundian government do not meet the wants and needs of the 
Burundian diaspora: “In particular, the majority of initiatives lack awareness about the 
political engagement and identity of Burundians in exile, thus often alienating them from the 
process” (p. 3).  
 
5.3 The post-conflict context 
Even though Rwanda has made a remarkable economic recovery after 1994 (Coulibaly, 
Ezemenari, and Duffy 2008), the country still faces important economic challenges: in 2006, 
almost 60 percent of Rwandans lived below the $1 poverty line (World Bank 2006), and 
inequality levels were rising in the early 2000s (Ansoms 2005). In addition the distribution of 
resources is a continued issue of concern in Rwanda. Moreover, despite the efforts of the 
government to restore social ties, recent analyses show that feelings of interpersonal distrust 
are increasing in Rwanda (NURC 2008). All of these factors form a threat to sustainable 
peace in the country. The business climate in Rwanda is very favourable, however, and 
investments and remittance levels are increasing fast (World Bank 2008; 2010). In addition 
                                                 
8 Migrants coming from different ethnic groups and during different waves (see previous section). 
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return migration programs such as the MIDA program have been successful in implementing 
different programs in Rwanda in the past years.  
In Burundi, however, the security situation is still fragile. In the years after the 
democratic elections, human rights abuses and corruption in the government are still reported 
(see e.g. HRW 2008; HRW 2009; Lemarchand 2006). News reports have recently indicated 
the emergence of new rebel groups in the north of the country. These developments form a 
serious threat to the country in general and to Burundi’s efforts to create an effective and 
sustainable migration policy in particular. Moreover, the threat of renewed or continued 
conflict prevents diaspora members from investing in Burundi and engaging in return 
programs. This is currently a clear concern for Burundian migrants, who hesitate to return to 
their country of origin due to issues of safety, security, and often-poor living conditions 
(Turner and Mossin 2010).  
During the years of conflict in Burundi, investments from the diaspora were few, and 
remittances were mainly sent to family members or for political goals (Fransen and Onga’yo 
2010; Turner and Mossin 2010). Even though investments are increasing slowly in Burundi, 
the current level of investment is still low (Turner and Mossin 2010). This is due to the fact 
that Burundians in the diaspora have not reacted yet to the new situation of post-conflict 
Burundi, in which their position has changed from political actors to players in the post-
conflict reconstruction processes. Another reason is that Burundians in the diaspora are 
highly educated but do not have a substantial level of wealth in order to make large 
investments.  
 
 
6. Conclusion: Diaspora Engagement in Conflict-Affected Societies 
Many factors such as a lack of resources and a lack of experience within home country 
governments naturally have a negative effect on diaspora engagement processes in general 
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(Agunias 2009). In addition to these challenges, conflict-affected societies such as Rwanda 
and Burundi face their own legacies from the past that might challenge or inhibit the process 
of diaspora engagement. Conflict-affected societies are often in a very fragile state of peace 
and are likely to be ruled by conflict again (Junne and Verkoren 2005). The level of 
willingness of the diaspora to engage in their home countries heavily depends on the political 
and security context within the country. At the same time, the roles of the diaspora in post-
conflict situations often changes from more politicized engagement to engagement in 
development and reconstruction. 
Agunias (2009) distinguishes four important conditions that increase the potential of 
creating an effective and sustainable diaspora engagement infrastructure in home countries. 
First, countries should collect as much information about their diaspora as possible, and 
governments should learn from the experiences of other countries that already have created 
successful institutions for diaspora engagement. Second, there should be a strong line of 
communication between the home country and the diaspora. Third, there should be 
coordinated efforts of the government to engage the diaspora and, fourth, the government 
should create incentives for the diaspora to participate in development processes by taking a 
leading role in initiating different projects and programs for diaspora engagement. 
Both Burundi and Rwanda have large diasporas spread across the globe with high 
concentrations in Europe, North America, and neighbouring countries. As these diasporas are 
increasingly considered as contributors to development, the challenge for the Burundian and 
Rwandan governments is to manage their diasporas’ potential with sustainable international 
migration and diaspora policies. Based on the information available, it seems that Rwanda is 
taking an active role in not only engaging its diaspora but in specifically addressing the 
challenges that they face in their diaspora engagement efforts as a conflict-affected country. 
The Rwandan government specifically focuses on addressing the unity within the Rwandan 
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diaspora and on stimulating communication between diaspora groups and their home country 
government. Whether or not these efforts pay off is difficult to assess at this stage. The 
Rwandan government has also been actively mapping the needs and wants of its diaspora in 
order to create custom-made engagement initiatives by participating in the IOM diaspora 
database. Again, whether or not the diaspora database is a successful tool for a conflict-
induced diaspora such as the Rwandan diaspora, which is characterized by diversity and low 
levels of trust, can only be analyzed after finalization of the database. The diaspora 
engagement initiatives in Rwanda are also embedded in the larger structure of the VISION 
2020 development plan. Incorporating the diaspora engagement initiatives into a larger 
development plan will be more effective in the long run, as it creates a vision and clear goals 
(Agunias 2009; De Haas 2006).  
Diaspora engagement in Burundi has until recently mostly relied on the initiatives of 
local and international organizations and different diaspora groups that operated without 
government support (Turner and Mossin 2010). The Burundian government is increasingly 
aware of its diaspora potential, but for the diaspora to contribute significantly to 
development, it is important that the Burundian government creates an effective and 
sustainable institutional environment within which this potential can thrive. For effective 
policy making, cooperation between ministries, international organizations, and diaspora 
groups is a necessity (IOM 2009). In addition, policies should be based and built on existing 
initiatives to effectively make use of the resources that the diaspora has. To this end the 
Burundian government should invest first in creating a clear overview of its diaspora, 
including its size, resources, and needs. One of the first tasks of the Diaspora Directorate is to 
map the diaspora, but it is still unclear how large of a challenge this will be. 
Despite all of the challenges that accompany diaspora engagement for conflict-
affected societies, there are some important opportunities for engaging diasporas in 
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development processes to mention as well. First, the involvement of diaspora groups in 
home-country affairs is often more accepted by local citizens as compared to the activities of 
donor countries and international organizations. This element of diaspora engagement is 
especially important in conflict-affected societies, which are often characterized by high 
levels of distrust towards international involvement (Newland and Patrick 2004). Second, 
diaspora communities often have strong ties with their origin countries and possess the 
knowledge on local processes that international actors might lack: “While Diasporas may 
exist physically outside the conflict zone, they have historical, cultural, economic and 
emotional ties to the direct actors in the conflict” (Cochrane 2007).  
Third, diasporas often have a lot to offer their homeland. Both the Burundian and 
Rwandan diasporas have high levels of education as compared to the average educational 
level in their home countries. Moreover, remittances are increasing steadily in both countries. 
Fourth, different diasporas often exert a high level of commitment to their country of origin 
(see e.g. Warnecke 2010). The Burundian and Rwandan diasporas have been politically 
active in the past years, and many individuals have organized themselves into numerous 
associations and groups through which they are involved in different dynamics within their 
home countries. This commitment, if managed well, is an important factor in determining 
diaspora potential for development. As Newland and Patrick (2004) mention: “the dense web 
of ties between the diaspora and country of origin is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
the creation of individuals and groups acting on their own initiative […]” (p. 17). For the 
creation of successful diaspora policies in the development arena, policy makers should 
therefore recognize that diasporas “are already mobilized” (De Haas 2006, p. ii). 
Overall, however, research on diaspora involvement and the effectiveness of this 
involvement is currently limited. A clear lack of data exists on the sizes and location of 
different diasporas (Oucho 2006) and about the needs of different diaspora groups. Moreover, 
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information on the opportunities they can contribute to local reconstruction and development 
processes is limited. Not much is known about the relationships within and among different 
diasporas in their host countries and on the relationship between the home country 
governments and their diasporas abroad as well. Having insufficient knowledge on its 
diaspora might lead a government to selectively address its diaspora by only focusing on the 
most visible or organized groups (see e.g. Sinatti 2010). In general the information on the 
impact diaspora can have on reconstruction and peace-building in conflict-affected societies 
is limited as well (Warnecke 2010). Future research should address these issues in order to 
create sound and effective policy advice.  
For all diaspora engagement initiatives to succeed in conflict-affected societies such 
as Burundi and Rwanda, however, the most important condition is that the countries’ security 
situations remain stable and become increasingly robust in the near future. This will enhance 
the trust that diasporas have in their own governments and with make the countries more 
attractive in terms of businesses and investments. In addition, incentives will be created for 
diaspora members to engage in either temporary or permanent return programs. Whereas in 
Rwanda the future looks promising, Burundi still has a long way to go. It is particularly 
important to engage the diaspora in moving from being political actors to being engaged for 
reconstruction and development and enhancing the relationships between the Burundian 
government and its citizens abroad. 
.  
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Appendix 1: Institutions Dealing with Diaspora Engagement in Rwanda & Burundi 
Rwanda Burundi 
Institution Responsibility Institution Responsibility 
    
GOVERNMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 
   
Ministry of External 
Relations and Internal 
Cooperation 
(MINAFFET), 
Diaspora General 
Directorate (DGD) 
-enforces the linkages 
between Rwanda and 
its citizens abroad. 
-provides information 
on investment 
possibilities, job 
opportunities, practical 
assistance to Rwandans 
who would like to be 
involved in their home 
country 
Ministry of External 
Relations and Internal 
Cooperation created 
the Directorate of 
Diaspora 
diaspora engagement, 
with understanding the 
greater diaspora and 
forging connections 
with them 
Rwandan Diaspora 
Mutual Fund (RDMF) 
with the National Bank 
of Rwanda (BNR) 
Supervised by the 
DGD and designed to 
collect the financial 
resources from 
Rwandans living 
abroad to invest in 
national development 
Ministry of Labour and 
Civil Service 
runs the Migration for 
Development in Africa 
(MIDA) 
  Ministry of Public 
Security in Burundi  
has been given 
exclusive 
responsibility to 
address migration 
management issues 
and to construct the 
migration and diaspora 
involvement policy 
CIVIL SOCIETY    
Rwanda Global 
Diaspora Network 
(RGDN) 
-umbrella organization 
for promoting 
cooperation and 
communication among 
the Rwandan diaspora. 
 -the goal of this 
network is to stimulate 
financial transfers  
from the diaspora to 
Rwanda 
  
INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
   
International 
Organization for 
Migration (IOM) 
-Migration for 
Development in Africa 
(MIDA) Great Lakes 
under DGD 
supervision 
-working on World 
Diaspora Database 
International 
Organization for 
Migration (IOM) 
Migration for 
Development in Africa 
(MIDA) Great Lakes 
run by the Ministry of 
Labour and Civil 
Service, helps shape 
migration and 
development policy 
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Voluntary Service 
Overseas (VSO) 
volunteer services 
provided 
  
United Nations 
Development 
Programme (UNDP) 
- support project to the 
Implementation of The 
Rwanda Transfer of 
Knowledge Through 
Expatriate Nationals 
(TOKTEN) Volunteer 
Programme 
- under DGD 
supervision 
  
NON-
GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS9 
   
Rwanda Convention 
Association (RCA) 
 Mutualité d’Epargne et 
de Crédit (Mutec) 
 
Rwanda-American 
Chamber of Commerce 
(RACC) 
 Competences Sans 
Frontiers (CSF), 
to involve the 
Burundian Diaspora in 
development 
Rwanda Diaspora 
Investment Ltd. 
 Communauté 
Burundaise de 
Belgique (CBB). 
 
   CIRID (Centre 
Indépendant de 
Recherches et 
d'Initiatives pour le 
Dialogue or 
Independent Centre of 
Research and Initiative 
for the Dialogue) 
promotes peaceful 
dialogue, the 
organization has also 
been involved in 
various development 
projects 
PRIVATE 
INSTITUTIONS 
   
  BCB (Banque de 
Crédit de Bujumbura) 
started two initiatives 
to help the diaspora in 
their financial 
activities in Burundi 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 These are only examples and not an exhaustive list of NGOs working on diaspora engagement 
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